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Abstract
Secure management of Australia’s commercial critical infrastructure presents ongoing challenges to owners
and the government. Although it is currently managed through high-level information sharing via collaboration,
but does this suit the commercial sector. One of the issues facing Australia is that the majority of critical
infrastructure resides under the control of the business sector and certain aspects such of the critical
infrastructure such as Supply Chain Management (SCM) systems are distributed entities and not a single entity.
The paper focuses upon the security issues associated with SCM systems and critical infrastructure protection.
Keywords
Critical infrastructure protection and Supply Change Management.

INTRODUCTION
The aim of the paper is to evaluate how Australia is protecting its NII (National Information Infrastructure) and
CII (Critical Information Infrastructure) in terms of developing strategies and implementing national policies
from a corporate viewpoint, NII (National Information Infrastructure) and its relationship with Supply Chain
Management Systems (SCM). The NII runs the day-to-day life of Australians, operates gas and electricity
supplies, banking and finance sectors, airports and transports, defence forces, telecommunications and
government departments.
A key factor is the concept of CII and how that relates to Australia/. CII is the subset of the NII that has a
national importance. Many of these aspects are related to corporate organisations and as such government
cannot have complete control and must instead try to influence corporations to correctly manage these aspects of
the NII and CII.
Within Australia, an annual national Computer Crime and Security Survey is undertaken to assess the sort of
computer crime occurring within Australia. An earlier AusCERT survey (AusCERT, 2004) identified that
organisational ignorance of criticality status could potentially undermine the reliability and security of
Australia’s CII, as these organisations are utilising the NII without realising their risk liability. The latest
AusCERT survey (AusCERT, 2006) showed that of the sample, only 34% of the organisations had indicated
that they were part of the CII, which is a lower percentage that one would expect. Therefore organisational
ignorance of criticality status could potentially undermine the reliability and security of Australia’s CII, as these
organisations are utilising the NII without realising their risk liability.

AUSTRALIA’S CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
Historically, much of Australia’s infrastructure was originally owned and operated by the public sector at the
federal, state and local government levels (Smith, 2004). However the majority of Australia’s critical
infrastructure has now been privatised and is under private sector ownership. Consequently, protecting
Australia’s critical infrastructure now requires a high level of cooperation between all levels of government and
the private sector owners. Hence, the federal government has developed a policy for critical infrastructure
protection that focuses broadly on addressing the following strategies (Australian Government, 2004):
Distinguishing critical infrastructures and ascertaining the areas risk;

Page 9

Proceedings of The 8th Australian Information Warfare and Security Conference
Aligning the strategies for reducing potential risk to critical infrastructure;
Encouraging and developing effective partnerships with state and territory governments and the private
sector;
Advancing both domestic and international best practice for critical infrastructure protection.
The Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN) is a forum in which the owners and operators of critical
infrastructure work together by sharing information on security issues which affect critical infrastructure (TISN,
2007). TISN requires the active participation of CIP owners and operators of CIP infrastructure, regulators,
professional bodies and industry associations, in cooperation with all levels of government, and the public. To
ensure this cooperation and coordination, all of these participants should commit to the following set of
common fundamental principles of CIP (TISN, 2007). These principles are (TISN, 2007):
1. CIP is centred on the need to minimise risks to public health, safety and confidence, ensure economic
security, maintain Australia’s international competitiveness and ensure the continuity of government
and its services.
2. The objectives of CIP are to identify critical infrastructure, analyse vulnerability and
interdependence, and protect from, and prepare for, all hazards.
3. As not all critical infrastructure can be protected from all threats, appropriate risk management
techniques should be used to determine relative severity and duration, the level of protective security,
set priorities for the allocation of resources and the application of the best mitigation strategies for
business continuity.
4. The responsibility for managing risk within physical facilities, supply chains, information
technologies and communication networks primarily rests with the owners and operators.
5. CIP needs to be undertaken from an 'all hazards approach' with full consideration of
interdependencies between businesses, sectors, jurisdictions and government agencies.
6. CIP requires a consistent, cooperative partnership between the owners and operators of critical
infrastructure and governments.
7. The sharing of information relating to threats and vulnerabilities will assist governments, and owners
and operators of critical infrastructure to better manage risk.
8. Care should be taken when referring to national security threats to critical infrastructure, including
terrorism, so as to avoid undue concern in the Australian domestic community, as well as potential
tourists and investors overseas.
9. Stronger research and analysis capabilities can ensure that risk mitigation strategies are tailored to
Australia’s unique critical infrastructure circumstances.
The Food Chain Assurance Advisory Group (the Food Chain Group) forms part of the TISN. The primary aim
of the Food Chain Group has been to improve the security of the agriculture and food supply chain in the
changed global security environment. The existing food safety and security systems and food regulatory
arrangements are primarily aimed at preventing and detecting natural or accidental risks. The new challenge is to
ensure these systems are now capable of responding to the new increased potential for acts of deliberate and
malicious intervention (FCIAAG, 2007).

SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT
Supply Chain Management (SCM) involve the flows of material, information and finance in a network
consisting of suppliers, manufacturers, distributors and customers (Lee, 2000) and is one area that can be
effectively adapted to eBusiness, especially if the Internet is used for the exchange of business information
(Lucian et al, 2002).
SCM is defined by the Global Supply Chain Forum (Lambert and Cooper, 2000) as the integration of key
business processes from end user through original suppliers that provides products, services and information that
add value for stakeholders. Cooper et al (1997) argue that the supply chain management evolves through several
stages of increasing intra- and inter-organizational integration and coordination. In a very broad sense and

Page 10

Proceedings of The 8th Australian Information Warfare and Security Conference
implementation, it spans the entire chain from initial source (supplier's supplier, etc) to ultimate consumer
(customer's customer, etc.).
As SCM technologies have developed in complexity, so to have the risks that are posed to the businesses that
employ them (Vasiu et al, 2002). Smith et al (2002) intimate some of main risks that businesses are exposed to
when doing business on the Internet:
•

Current software engineering techniques do not produce systems that are immune to attack;

•

Organisations do not have the expertise to defend their systems against attack;

•

Cyberspace legislation lags behind current attack trends;

•

Little evidence to suggest improved security since organisations are continually playing ‘catch-up’ with
routinely discovered vulnerabilities;

•

Current security tools only address piecemeal technical aspects of security whereas information
security is a holistic issue; and,

•

System administration is difficult to manage due to continuous system patching.

The attraction of utilising the convenience of the Internet for communication interconnectivity between SCM
partners can expose these businesses to security risks and vulnerabilities that if breached, will compromise the
security of the entire SCM, thus placing other businesses involved with the SCM are at risk.

SUPPLY CHANGE MANAGEMENT AND PRIOR SECURITY RESEARCH
In terms of SCM security there has been prior research undertaken by the research team in relation to SCM and
electronic fraud. This research is important because the security risks associated with CIP SCM cannot be
considered in isolation. If a key SCM system is compromised by traditional fraud then the impact could have a
national impact and could also be an indicated of more serious security issues associated with that SCM
It is extremely difficult to put hard figures on the incidence of SCM electronic fraud. The explanations are lack
of awareness that fraud has occurred and under-reporting. The last one is due to fear of loss of goodwill (Vasiu
et al, 2002), pessimism regarding the apprehension of attackers, dissatisfaction with the outcomes of previous
criminal proceedings and a common preference to take administrative action and attempt to recover losses
without criminal charges .
Benbow (1992) identifies five types of fraudsters:
• the opportunist: having the ability and knowledge to manipulate accounts;
• the habitual claimant: using many different names to commit fraud time and time again;
• the patient claimant: perpetrating the same fraud time and time again;
• the providers: volumes of fraudulent transactions by providers can easily be committed; and
• the organized gang: large organized gangs running complex frauds.
According to Di Nicola and Scartezzini (2000), the more complex the context in which fraudsters operate, the
more professional experience they require and the broader organizational structures they need in order to
commit their crimes. Large-scale crimes need organization to better achieve results and to reduce risks.
Criminals need detailed information on techniques and practices in order to assess opportunities and risk.
The three electronic fraud methods are:


Input (“data diddling” or “number fudging”): the fraudster dishonestly enters false data, suppresses, or
amends data as entered (a variant on common false accounting). It is the most common computer crime
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(Vasiu et al, 2002) and can be committed by anyone having access to normal data-processing functions
at the input stage.




Program:

this involves either the creation of a program with a view to fraud or the alteration or amendment
of a program to such ends. It is very difficult to discover and is frequently not recognized (Vasiu et al,
2002)). It requires computer-specific knowledge and high level access to computer databases and/or
software (Vasiu et al, 2002), and for this reason, it is usually associated with insiders.
Output:

the fraudster dishonestly suppresses or amends data being output—very often linked with input
fraud (e.g. suppressing or changing balance reports to hide misappropriated funds). The goal with this
type of scheme is to conceal bogus inputs and also to prevent or postpone detection of such input fraud
(Vasiu et al, 2002). This type of fraud is relatively unsophisticated and is concerned with the end
product; because computer output is normally accepted as being accurate and genuine its authenticity is
taken for granted.

The greatest concern present the frauds that involve manipulation of data records or computer programs to
disguise the true nature of transactions, cracking into an organization’s computer system to manipulate business
information and unauthorized transfers of funds electronically
Based upon the research a conceptual framework (Vasiu et al, 2002) was developed that described the issues of
electronic fraud within SCM, this is shown by figure 1.

Figure 1: Conceptual framework of electronic Fraud within SCM

SCM CASE STUDIES
The following actual real life examples show the impact that failures within Australian SCM systems have had.
The examples focus upon the state of Victoria, Australia.

Car Industry
The automotive industry is one of Australia’s key manufacturing sectors and an important source of
employment, and research and development. The increasing exposure of the Australian automotive
industry to international competition has seen it develop to where it is now competing successfully in
global markets. There is also a strong inter-dependence between the car makers and their suppliers, and
strong linkages with the rest of the economy (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2005).
In August, 2007, 200 workers from Melbourne based plastic parts supplier Venture went on strike in
regards to $25 million in redundancy entitlements. They supplied the Australian Car Industry will many
of the parts used in the car manufacturing process. As a consequence of the strike, 1850 assembly line
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and engine workers at Ford's Victorian plants in Broadmeadows and Geelong were stood down without
pay and all manufacting at those plants ceased (Herald Sun, 2007a; News.Com.AU, 2007).
The actions of a single car parts supplier caused all car manufacturing within the state of Victoria to
cease for several weeks.
Power Supply
On 16th January, 2007, 4pm a power blackout impacted Victoria and left 200,0000 homes and
businesses without electricity as well as disrupting Melbourne's public transport system and road
network.
A bushfire at Benalla burnt a main power line cable between Victoria and New South Wales. The black
out caused about 1,200 traffic signals across the Melbourne and Geelong metropolitan area to fail and
the power failure interrupted the metropralition train systems within Victoria. SP AusNet eventually
restored power to the Victorian - New South Wales interconnector powerline on the 17th January at
12:30 a.m. (Herald Sun, 2007b; The Age, 2007).
This examples shows how a failure of a critical service such as power can completelty disrupte the
operation of a SCM.

RESEARCH FOCUS
The initial description of the research within the paper is the start of a new research project. The research will
focus upon:
•

identification of commercial critical systems within Australia and also other countries that have defined
critical infrastructure systems;

•

analysis of open source intelligence to identify security threats and risks that have occurred against
commercial critical systems, e.g. potential security risks and threats that complex SCM systems could
face;

•

review of existing security approaches applied to SCM systems and whether they can be applied to
protecting more generic commercial critical systems linked to critical infrastructure;

•

review of traditional security risk analysis approaches to identify how traditional approaches could deal
with complex security issues.

CONCLUSION
The security of the any SCM is only as strong as its weakest link and therefore it is incumbent upon the
individual organisational partners that make up the SCM to be proactive in continuously improving their
security measures and policies in order to effectively protect or indeed pre-empt any likely damage resulting
from possible threats and vulnerabilities and their subsequent adverse effects on the functionality of the SCM.
The issue with critical SCMs is any failure will not just impact the SCM partners but could have the possibility
of impacting entire industrial sectors or impacting Australia as a whole.
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